MEMORANDUM IN REGARD TO THE LIANCOURT ROCKS
Ambassador Allison contends (Tokoyo's 1306, November23) that the
is "inescapably involved" in the Takeshima dispute. In evidence, he points to the Rusk note of 1951 and to the Potsdam Declaration, the Peace Treaty, etc.. United States
There can be no question that the
has committed itself to an attitude in this matter. However, I fail to see that the commitment carries with it the obligation to intervene between two contestants who are now sovereign nations and who have available to them ample machinery for settlement of such disputes. I cannot believe that a dispute of such essentially unimportant nature will lead to a situation serious enough to justify an intervention by us which could only create lasting resentment on the part of the loser. This is certainly no time to ezacerbate our relations with either country. I think that this hands-off position should be maintained regardless of the validity of the claim of either party. I think that the Department is of firm grounds in maintaining that the United States Government is "not legitimately involved in this matter" as has already been pointed out in the Department's note to the Embassy. United States
The Liancourt Rocks case appears to have aspects in common with that of
Shikotan Island, off the coast of , which was occupied by Soviet troops in 1945. We have publicly declared our view that this Island belongs to Hokkaido Japan, but no one in Japanor elsewhere seriously expects us to take military action under the Security Treaty to reclaim this Island for . I think we need not feel undue anxiety even in the unlikely contingency that Japan should invoke the Security Treaty with respect to the Liancourt Japan
Nevertheless, I do not think we can or should continue to withhold indefinitely an expression of our position in this matter, particularly if the dispute continues to worsen.
Sooner or later the Japanese will get wind of the Rusk letter and will then resent our failure to inform them of something which would measurably strengthen thier position. Even if they do not, I think we would be remiss in not apprising the Japanese of a position which we have consistently maintained and which we
are under no obligation not to divulge.
Accordingly, I suggest that we adopt the following course of action;
Express to the ROK Government our concern over repeated clashes with the Japanese over the Liancourt Rocks.
Remind the ROK of our previous statement of view (the Rusk letter); express strong hope that settlement can be reached with the Japanese; state that the United States
seeksto avoid any form of intervention in this matter but if clashes continue to occur we may be forced to give publicity to the Rusk letter and to reiterate the view expressed therein; suggest that if the ROK can not accept the view expressed in the Rusk letter, it take steps toward arbitration or appeal the matter to the ICJ.
In case the foregoing steps do not alleviate the situation, seek an appropriate occasion to publicize the Rusk note and disclaim any desire to intervene in this matter.
William T. Turner
1953 November: Secret Security Information of USA
After the Installation of Syngman Rhee Line - American Documents: Part Four
The following document was written on Nevember 30th 1953 by William T. Turner, who was a deputy chief of mission (counselor) in the U.S. Embassy in Japan.
He pointed out that Liancourt Rocks are in the same position as Shikotan island, the Japanese island that was illegally occupied by USSR. USA knew that they were Japanese territory but they didn't think to fight against USSR or ROK.
He also wrote that "Remind ROK of the Rusk letter" that means "remind ROK that Liancourt Rocks are Japanese territory" or they would give publicity to the Rusk's Letter, which was not open to Japanese government yet.