1951 Coversation of Yu Chan Yang with John F. Dulles.

History of San Francisco Peace Treaty: Part Eight

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From: "Foreign Realtions of the United States" 1951, Asia and the Pacific. Volume VI, Part 1, pp. 1182-1184.

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To follow is from a memorandum of conversation of Dr. Yu Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador, with Amabasador John Foster Dulles, Robert A. Fearey and Arthur B. Emmons. The conversation took place in Washington on July 9th, 1951.

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean
Affairs in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET

[Washington,] July 9, 1951.

Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty

Participants: Dr. Yu Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador

Ambassador John Foster Dulles

Mr. Robert A Fearey, FE

Mr. Arthur B Emmons, 3^rd., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs

The Korean ambassador called on Ambassador Dulles at 11:30 this
morning by prior appointment. Ambassador Dulles opened the conversation by
handing Ambassador Yang the text of the latest draft of the Japanese peace
treaty. He explained to the Ambassador that this draft should be considered
Secret until its publication. He also stated that the Department would instruct
Ambassador Muccio to make a copy of the draft available right away to the ROK
Government.

Ambassador Dulles pointed out to the Korean ambassador that the ROK Government would not be a signatory to the treaty, since only those nations in a state of war with Japan and which were signatories of the United Nations Declaration of January 1942 would sign the treaty. He pointed out, however, that Korea would benefit from all of the
general provisions of the treaty equally with other nations.

Ambassador Yang expressed his surprise that ROK would not be
included as a signatory, and protested that the Korean Provisional Government
had, in fact, been in a state of war with Japan even for many years prior to World War II. He stressed that there had been a Korean division in China which had
fought against the Japanese and that a declaration of war against Japan had been made by the Korean Provisional Government. The Korean ambassador therefore, considered on this basis that Korea should be a signatory. Mr. Frearey pointed out that the Unites States Government had never given recognition to the Korean Provisional Government.

The Korean Ambassador then asked whether the Islands of Tsushima
was to given to Korea under the terms of the treaty, stating that Tsushima properly belonged to Korea. Ambassador Dulles took exception to this statement and pointed out that Japan had been in full control of Tsushima for a very long period of time; the treaty therefore did not affect the present status of Tsushima as a minor Japanese island.

Ambassador Yang then asked whether the treaty included provisions
which would restrict Japanese fishing in waters in the vicinity of the Korean
peninsula, pointing out that this matter had already been a source of friction
between Korea and Japan, which boded no good for future Korean-Japanese relations. He stated that some 34 fishing vessels had recently been intercepted and arrested by the ROK Navy while fishing in waters beyond the so-called MacArthur Line. Dr. Yang stressed the vital importance to the Korean economy of controlling such unrestricted Japanese fishing activities in waters close to Korea.Ambassador Dulles replied that the treaty did not include provisions which would govern fishing in specific high seas areas and that to have included such provisions would have meant a very serious delay in the conclusion of the treaty, since there were many national fishing interests
concerned. He explained that the treaty, as such, could not be permitted to
become an international fishing convention for the Pacific but that it did
contain provisions for the negotiation of bilateral or multilateral fishing
agreements with Japan. Ambassador Dulles emphasized that the Department had been under considerable pressure from various quarters, including Unites States and Canadian fishing interests, to write specific restrictions on Japanese fishing into the treaty, but that in the interest of getting the treaty through as quickly as possible
this pressure had been resisted in every instance.

In further connection with the fishing question, Ambassador Yang
raised the point that, if Japan were to be allowed to re-arm, there would
not be any future guarantee that control over fishing or other international
problems, including the general security of the area, could effectively be
exercised over Japan. Ambassador Dulles then discussed the undesirability of a restrictive treaty, pointing out that restrictions in the past, as for instance at Versailles, had inevitably resulted in their becoming a challenge to the country upon which they were imposed and a psychological target for national opposition. He believed that more subtle methods of control would be more effective, pointing out that the United States would have troops in Japan and that the Unites States and other Pacific nations could control the flow of raw materials into Japan and the level of its war-making
potential. He added that the Unites States and the other Pacific nations
were fully alive to the danger inherent in a resurgence of Japanese military
strength and were determined to control this danger through all of the extensive
means at their disposal; in so doing the security interests of Korea would naturally be a factor.
Ambassador Dulles also referred to the threat presented by Russian attempts to
win Japan away from the West and stated that from this point of view a moderate and workable treaty with Japan was most desirable.

Mr. Emmons suggested that the Korean Ambassador might be
interested in the provisions of the treaty which dealt with bilateral
negotiations between Japan and other interested Powers on
such collateral questions as high seas fishing. Ambassador Dulles read the
Korean Ambassador pertinent sections of the treaty dealing with this
question.

In closing the conversation Ambassador Yang expressed his desire
to have an opportunity for further discussions with Ambassador Dulles,
presumably after receipt of instructions from his Government.

This is a very interesting record. The Korean Ambassador only claimed Tsushima, definitely an integral part of Japan, but not Liancourt Rocks. Apparently, as his claim was instantly rejected, they would bring another target to the next conversation 10 days later. The Ambassador also told about the MacArthur Line in conjunction with the fishing problem, this may have been a hint of the future Rhee Syngman Line and the Liancourt Rocks issue.